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M any of the deficiencies of password authen-tication systems arise from human memorylimitations. If humans didn’t have to re-member their passwords, a maximally se-
cure password would have maximum entropy: it would
consist of a string as long as the system allows with char-
acters selected from those the system permits in a man-
ner that provides no redundancy—that is, totally random
selection. These requirements run contrary to the prop-
erties of human memory, however. Human memory for
sequences of items is temporally limited,1 with a short-
term capacity of around seven plus or minus two items.2
In addition, when humans do remember a sequence of
items, those items must be familiar chunks such as words
or familiar symbols.2 Finally, human memory thrives on
redundancy—we’re much better at remembering infor-
mation we can encode in multiple ways.3
Password authentication therefore involves a trade-
off. Some passwords are easy to remember (for example,
single words in a user’s native language), but also easy to
guess through dictionary searches. Other passwords are
secure against guessing but difficult to remember. In this
case, human limitations can compromise the password’s
security because the user might keep an insecure written
record of it or resort to insecure backup authentication
procedures after forgetting it. This doesn’t mean we ac-
cept the common doctrine that writing passwords down
is always wrong. If your machine isn’t in a publicly acces-
sible area, writing down a long, random boot password
and taping it to the machine can be worthwhile because
you can then have a strict policy against disclosing pass-
words over the phone. Preventing social engineering at-
tacks is a separate research topic, however.
We conducted an empirical inves-
tigation of this trade-off in a population
of password users. Research in cognitive psychology has
defined many limits of human performance in laboratory
settings where experimental subjects are required to
memorize random and pseudorandom sequences of
symbols. It’s difficult to generalize from such research to
password users, who can select the string, rehearse it
while memorizing, and must recall it at regular intervals
over a long period of time. We show that in this context,
users can exploit mnemonic strategies for password
memorization. Humans can use many mnemonic tech-
niques to successfully memorize apparently random se-
quences. Password alternatives such as Passfaces exploit su-
perior human memory for faces, for example.4 Rather
than change the password authentication procedure,
however, we suggest changing the advice given to users
for selecting passwords.
Password selection advice 
Anne Adams and Martina Angela Sasse note that users
aren’t enemies of security, but collaborators who need
appropriate information to help maintain system secu-
rity.5 They observe that users, when not told how to
choose good passwords, make up rules for password
generation, resulting in insecure passwords. They
therefore recommend that organizations “provide in-
struction and training on how to construct usable and
secure passwords.” 
Later research by Sasse, Sacha Brostoff, and Dirk
Weirich based on a survey of system users found that 90
percent of them had difficulty with standard password
mechanisms and that they welcomed advice on password
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Users rarely choose passwords that are both hard to guess
and easy to remember. To determine how to help users
choose good passwords, the authors performed a controlled
trial of the effects of giving users different kinds of advice.
Some of their results challenge the established wisdom.
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generation. (See the “Related work on password selec-
tion and memorability” sidebar.) The authors conclude
that, “instructions for constructing and memorizing a
strong password ... should be available when a password
needs to be chosen or changed.” 
Many large organizations do give specific advice to
new users about selecting good passwords. For example, a
password should be reasonably long, use a reasonably
large character set, and still be easy to remember. There
are some subtleties about whether the attacker will try
many passwords over a network or has obtained a copy of
the password file and is cracking it offline, but we propose
to ignore them in the present study.
We informally surveyed advice given to new users at
large sites by searching the Web for the terms “choose,”
“good,” and “password.” Many sites didn’t recognize
memorability’s importance; rather, they merely empha-
sized resistance to brute-force search. Some typical pieces
of advice were: 
[A good] password should consist of mixed charac-
ters or special characters, and should not consist of
words found in the dictionary. It should not be
written down in an easily accessible place and espe-
cially not next to login. It may either be all in capi-
tal or small type letters. 
Use the output from a random password generator.
Select a random string that can be pronounced and
is easy to remember. For example, the random
string “adazac” can be pronounced a-da-zac, and
you can remember it by thinking of it as “A-to-Z.”
Add uppercase letters to create your own empha-
sis—for example, aDAzac.2.
Good passwords appear to be random characters.
The wider the variety of characters the better.
Mixing letters with numbers is better than letters
alone. Mixing special characters with number and
letters is better still.
One recommendation that seems increasingly popu-
lar is the pass phrase approach to password generation. A
typical description of this is as follows: 
A good technique for choosing a password is to use
the first letters of a phrase. However, don’t pick a
well known phrase like “An apple a day keeps the
doctor away” (Aaadktda). Instead, pick something
like “My dog’s first name is Rex” (MdfniR) or
“My sister Peg is 24 years old” (MsPi24yo).
Of course, our informal survey doesn’t include sites
that don’t give users advice on password selection. We be-
lieve that many simply tell new users the minimum re-
quirement for a valid password (length and character set),
with no further advice regarding security or memorabil-
ity. Others, in our experience, enforce rules such as
Passwords must be at least eight characters long and
must contain at least two nonletter characters.
They must also be changed at least once a month.
Users typically respond to such rules with a per-
sonal password generation system, such as “Juliet03”
for March, “Juliet04” for April, and so on. This system
is clearly weak. Other attempts to compel user behav-
ior have backfired. For example, Bill Patterson reports
that when users were forced to change their passwords
and prevented from using their previous few choices,
they changed passwords rapidly to exhaust the history
list and get back to their favorite password.6 Forbid-
ding password changes until after 15 days prevented
users from changing possibly compromised passwords
without the system administrator’s help.6 If the restric-
tions placed on users are tedious, users will likely cir-
cumvent them.5
Designing advice to users and enforcing it on a system
level are important problems involving subtle questions of
applied psychology with no obvious answers.
Experimental study
To investigate the trade-off between security and mem-
orability in a real-world context, we compared the ef-
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Figure 1. Control group instruction sheet. We asked participants to
choose a seven-character password with at least one nonletter.
Password Experiment—Group A
This sheet offers some advice on how to choose a good computer
password. We are giving you this sheet as part of the password security
experiment that was described in your introductory lecture. Different people
are receiving different advice (but all advice should result in passwords at
least as secure as you would choose if not participating in the experiment).
Please do not discuss the experiment, this advice, or your choice of
password with your friends.
Please log on using the initial password you have been issued, and
choose a new password not known to anybody else. The “Windows NT
Tutor” tells you how to do this on pages 1.6–1.7.
Your password should be at least seven characters long and contain at
least one nonletter.
If you have already changed your initial password to one of your
choice, and your new password meets this standard, then you do not
need to change it again. However we strongly recommend that you
change your password from time to time—at least once a term. As the
experiment will run for the duration of this academic year, please keep
this sheet and use this advice again when you choose your new
passwords for Lent and Easter.
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fects of giving three alternative forms of password selec-
tion advice to different user groups. The experimental
subjects were first-year students in the University of
Cambridge’s School of Natural Sciences, which includes
physics, chemistry, geology, and materials science. All
Natural Sciences students are given an account on a cen-
tral computing facility with a user ID and a randomly
generated initial passwords. They also have access to sev-
eral other facilities. When students receive their account
details, they are generally advised to select their own
passwords. Some students receive this advice informally
from their department or residence hall computer offi-
cer. Many students attend a central facility introductory
lecture and tutorial session.
Methodology
We asked students attending the introductory lecture to
participate in an experiment on password selection. Of
the 300 students at the lecture, 288 consented to partici-
pate in the experiment. At the tutorial session, we ran-
domly assigned students to one of three experimental
groups and gave each group a sheet of advice. (Figures
1–3 show the text we used.)
• We gave the control group (95 members) traditional ad-
vice—that is, “Your password should be at least seven
characters long and contain at least one nonletter.” (See
Figure 1.)
• We gave the random password group (96 members) a sheet of
paper with the letters A–Z and the numbers 1–9 printed
repeatedly on it. We told them to select a password by
closing their eyes and randomly picking eight characters.
We advised them to keep a written record with them
until they’d memorized the password. (See Figure 2.)
• We told the pass phrase group (97 members) to choose a
password based on a mnemonic phrase. (See Figure 3.)
We expected that the random password group would
have stronger passwords than the pass phrase group but
would find them harder to remember and easier to forget;
and that the pass phrase group would stand in the same re-
lation to the control group. One month after the tutorial
sessions, we took a snapshot of all password files and con-
ducted four types of attack on the passwords:
• Dictionary attack: Simply use different dictionary files to
crack passwords. 
• Permutation of words and numbers: For each word from a
dictionary file, permute with 0, 1, 2 and 3 digit(s) to
construct possible password candidates. Also, make
common number substitutions, such a 1 for I, 5 for S,
and so on. 
• User information attack: Exploit user data collected from
password files (such as userid, user full name, and initial
substring of name) to crack passwords. 
• Brute-force attack: Try all possible combinations of keys. 
We performed all but the fourth attack against all pass-
words, and attempted the fourth attack only on passwords
that were six characters long.
We collected information on password length distrib-
ution and the number of cracked passwords in each
group. We monitored the number of times users’ pass-
words were reset, assuming users might forget the more
difficult passwords and would either have to ask system
administrators to reset their passwords or use other facili-
ties. Four months after the tutorial, we surveyed experi-
mental subjects by email, asking how difficult it was to re-
member their passwords and how many weeks had passed
before they’d memorized it.
We also tested our experimental sample’s validity by
making the same attacks on the accounts of 100 first-year
students who hadn’t attended the introductory lecture or
received experimental instructions.
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Figure 2. Random password group instruction sheet. Group members
chose their passwords by closing their eyes and pointing randomly to
a grid of numbers and letters.
Password Experiment—Group B
This sheet offers some advice on how to choose a good computer
password. We are giving you this sheet as part of the password security
experiment that was described in your introductory lecture. Different people
are receiving different advice (but all advice should result in passwords at
least as secure as you would choose if not participating in the experiment).
Please do not discuss the experiment, this advice, or your choice of
password with your friends.
A secure password is one that is very difficult to guess. Words that
appear in a dictionary, or the names of people or places, are easy to
guess. The most difficult passwords to guess are random sequences of
letters. To help you choose a random sequence of letters for your
password, we have printed a grid of random letters overleaf. Choose
your password by closing your eyes and pointing at a random place on
the grid. Choose eight characters this way and write them down on a
scrap of paper.
Now log on using the initial password you have been issued, change
your password to the new random password which you have chosen. The
“Windows NT Tutor” tells you how to do this on pages 1.6–1.7.
You may find your password difficult to remember at first. Make sure
that the scrap of paper on which you have written it is in a secure place,
such as the back of your wallet or purse.
You should find that once you have entered it a dozen times or so, you
will be able to remember it. Once you are sure you can remember it,
destroy the scrap of paper where you wrote it down.
Finally, we strongly recommend that you change your password from
time to time—at least once a term. As the experiment will run for the
duration of this academic year, please keep this sheet and use this advice
again when you choose your new passwords for Lent and Easter.
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Results
The selected passwords were on average between 7 and 8
characters long (7.6, 8.0, and 7.9 for the three groups, re-
spectively). All three experimental groups chose slightly
longer passwords than the sample group (mean length
7.3, difference statistically significant at t = 4.53, p <
.001), who hadn’t attended the introductory lecture.
The permuted dictionary attack was the most success-
ful. Cracking passwords based on user information wasn’t
successful in any case, probably because of the limited
amount of user information available in the password files
(they don’t include first names, for example). A brute-
force attack successfully cracked all six-character pass-
words. Table 1 summarizes these results (treating brute-
force attacks separately).
Password selection advice didn’t affect the six-charac-
ter passwords’ susceptibility to brute-force attacks. In
each experimental group, as well as in the comparison
sample, a few users ignored the advice regarding password
length and chose an insecure password.
We successfully cracked far more of the passwords that
were longer than six characters in the control group than
in either the random character or pass phrase group (sig-
nificant at χ2 = 24.8, p < .001). The proportion of pass-
words cracked in the control group was lower than in the
comparison sample (for example, 13 percent of the com-
parison sample used six-character passwords versus 5 per-
cent in the control group; 13 passwords in the compari-
son sample were verbatim dictionary words versus three
in the control group).
All passwords that were cracked successfully in the
random character and pass phrase groups were dictionary
words or permutations of dictionary words and numbers,
contrary to advice given to the student. These results, to-
gether with the number of six-character passwords, pro-
vide a reasonable estimate of the level of user noncompli-
ance with password-selection advice.
No one used special characters (neither letters nor
numbers) except in the pass phrase group, whose instruc-
tions had given examples of passwords containing punc-
tuation. This suggests that users should be explicitly en-
couraged to select passwords combining alpha, numeric,
and special characters.
Very few users asked the system administrator to
reset their passwords. Within a three-month period fol-
lowing the tutorial session, two members of the control
group, one member of the random password group, and
three members of the pass phrase group requested ad-
ministrator resets.
Our email survey, which we sent to participants four
months after beginning the experiment, asked two
questions:
• How hard did you find it to memorize your password,
on a scale from 1 (trivial) to 5 (impossible)?
• For how long did you have to carry around a written
copy of the password to refer to? Please estimate the
length of time in weeks.
Of the 242 replies we received, 13 indicated that the
student had not used their accounts or had dropped the
course. Valid responses from the groups clearly differed, as
Table 2 shows.
Users in the random password group reported having
more difficulty remembering their passwords (significant
at t = 8.25, p < .001) and keeping a written copy for far
longer (significant at t = 6.41, p < .001) than the other
groups. This confirms Moshe Zviran and William Haga’s
results in an operational setting (see the “Related work”
sidebar).
Because the differences in response rates weren’t sig-
nificant, we don’t believe our results were significantly
skewed by students in the random password group find-
ing our advice so difficult that they stopped using the
computer facilities.
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Figure 3. Pass phrase group instruction sheet. Group members
chose passwords based on mnemonic phrases. 
Password Experiment—Group C 
This sheet offers some advice on how to choose a good computer
password. We are giving you this sheet as part of the password security
experiment that was described in your introductory lecture. Different people
are receiving different advice (but all advice should result in passwords at
least as secure as you would choose if not participating in the experiment).
Please do not discuss the experiment, this advice, or your choice of
password with your friends.
To construct a good password, create a simple sentence of 8 words and
choose letters from the words to make up a password. You might take the
initial or final letters; you should put some letters in upper case to make the
password harder to guess; and at least one number and/or special character
should be inserted as well. Use this method to generate a password of seven
or eight characters.
An example of such a composition might be using the phrase is “It’s 12
noon I am hungry” to create the password “I’s12&Iah” which is hard for
anyone else to guess but easy for you to remember. By all means use a
foreign language if you know one: the password “AwKdk.Md” from the
phrase “Anata wa Kyuuketsuki desu ka ... Miyu desu” would be an example.
You could even mix words from several languages. However, do not just use
a word or a name from a foreign language. Try being creative! 
Now log on using the initial password you have been issued, change
your password to the new password which you have chosen. The “Windows
NT Tutor” tells you how to do this on pages 1.6–1.7. Do not write your new
password down.
Finally, we strongly recommend that you change your password from
time to time—at least once a term. As the experiment will run for the
duration of this academic year, please keep this sheet and use this advice
again when you choose your new passwords for Lent and Easter.
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Many members of the random character group still
carried written copies of their passwords at the time of
the survey, indicating that they hadn’t been able to mem-
orize them.
Folk beliefs: True or false?
Our study confirms a number of widely held folk beliefs
about passwords and debunks some others.
We’ve confirmed two folk beliefs—that users have
difficulty remembering random passwords and that pass-
words based on mnemonic phrases are harder to guess
than naïvely selected passwords. 
However, we’ve debunked another folk belief—that
random passwords are better than passwords based on
mnemonic phrases. In our study, each appeared to be as
strong as the other. 
We’ve likewise debunked the belief that passwords
based on mnemonic phrases are harder to remember than
naively selected passwords. In fact, each type is as easy to
remember as the other. 
The last folk belief is that we can significantly im-
prove security by educating users to select random or
mnemonic passwords. In fact, both types of passwords
suffered from a noncompliance rate of about 10 percent
(including too-short passwords and passwords chosen
contrary to the instructions). Although this is better
than the approximately 35 percent of users who choose
bad passwords with only cursory instruction, it’s not a
huge improvement. The attacker might have to work
three times harder, but without password policy en-
forcement mechanisms, we can’t make the attacker
work a thousand times harder. In fact, our experimen-
tal group might be the most compliant a systems ad-
ministrator can expect. Thus, this belief also appears to
be debunked. In applications where one user can be
harmed by another user’s negligence, compliance
monitoring and enforcement may be just as important
as education.
Previous work suggests that the noncompliance rate
could be even higher when users are required to remem-
ber multiple passwords, which usually increases the user’s
cognitive overhead and decreases memorability.5 How-
ever, the issue of multiple passwords is beyond the scope
of our experimental study.
T he work we report here is merely a first step toward abetter understanding of the applied psychology as-
pects of computer security. Many questions remain unan-
swered, and we plan to continue our experiments with fu-
ture cohorts of students. In the meantime, we have some
tentative recommendations for system administrators:
• Instruct users to choose mnemonic-based passwords,
which are as memorable as naively selected passwords
but as hard to guess as randomly chosen passwords. 
• Size matters. With systems like Unix, which limit ef-
fective password length to eight characters, users
should choose passwords of exactly eight characters.
With systems such as Netware, which allows 14 char-
acters but doesn’t recognize case, users could be ad-
vised to choose passwords with 10 or more characters,
which might further encourage the use of mnemon-
ics. (This is a topic for our future work, as is enforce-
ment generally.)
• Entropy per character also matters. Instruct users to
choose passwords containing numbers and special char-
acters as well as letters. If you don’t, most users will
choose passwords from a very small subset of the total
password space.
• Compliance is the most critical issue. In systems where
users can only put themselves at risk, it might be pru-
dent to leave them to their own devices. In that case,
expect that about 10 percent will choose weak pass-
words despite their instructions. In systems where a
user’s negligence can affect other users (for example, in
systems where an intruder who gains access to a single
user account can rapidly become root—that is, illicitly
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GROUP RESPONSES DIFFICULTY WEEKS
LEVEL (1–5)
Control group 80 1.52 0.7
Random 71 3.15 4.8
password group
Pass phrase group 78 1.67 0.6
Table 2. Responses to the email memorability survey.
GROUP PASSWORDS CRACKED USING FIRST THREE ATTACKS PASSWORDS CRACKED
NUMBER PERCENT OF TOTAL USING BRUTE-FORCE ATTACKS
Control group 30 32 3
Random password group 8 8 3
Pass phrase group 6 6 3
Comparison sample 33 33 2
Table 1. Results of password attacks, by test group. 
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get a system administrator’s privileges—using well-
known and widely available techniques), consider en-
forcing password quality by system mechanisms.
• If a benefit is to be had from the use of centrally assigned
random passwords, it appears to come from the fact of
central assignment (which enforces compliance) rather
than randomness (which can be achieved with
mnemonic phrases).
An interesting and important challenge is finding com-
pliance enforcement mechanisms that work well with
mnemonic password choice. Proactive password check-
ers,7 which verify that a password is not part of a known
weak subset of the password space, might be an effective
tool. But as this article has shown, what engineers expect
to work and what users actually make to work are two
different things. Rigorous experimental testing of inter-
face usability is in our view a necessary ingredient for ro-
bust secure systems. 
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The literature on password selection and memorability is sur-prisingly sparse. In their classic paper on Unix security, Fred
Grampp and Robert Morris describe a test in which users were
forced to create passwords of at least six characters with at least
one nonletter.1 The authors made a file of the 20 most common
female names, each followed by a single digit. Of these 200
passwords, at least one was in use on each of several dozen
machines they examined. Daniel Klein collected 13,797 password
file entries from Unix systems and attacked them by exhaustive
search, cracking about a quarter of them.2 Password management
guidelines from the US Department of Defense recommend using
machine-generated random passwords.3
Moshe Zviran and William Haga asked 106 students to choose
passwords and write them on a questionnaire.4 The questionnaires
also gave each student a random password and asked them to
remember both. Three months later, 35 percent of the students
could recall their self-selected passwords but only 23 percent
recalled their assigned random passwords. In addition, 14 percent
wrote the self-selected passwords down whereas 66 percent wrote
down the random password. The students weren’t actually using
the passwords during the intervening three months, however. So,
although these results provide a quantitative point of reference for
the difficulty of remembering random passwords, the test doesn’t
model a real operational environment.
Anne Adams and Martina Angela Sasse, and Sasse, Sacha
Brostoff, and Dirk Weirich surveyed system users about their
experiences with passwords.5,6 Although they discussed memora-
bility issues and concluded that users should be instructed to
construct secure and memorable passwords, neither article put
much effort into identifying “specific, positive advice” on how to
“compose passwords that are both easy to remember and dif-
ficult to crack.”7
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